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While much has been made of European perceptions of China, there remains a gap in 
understanding of its newest foreign policy tool: the BRI. Understood as a vehicle of China’s 
diplomacy in the European Union, the BRI can be examined as an ever-evolving concept whose 
positive reception constitutes a large part of its success. Due to the recency of the BRI, the media 
have an important role to play in informing public opinion through framing. Therefore, this 
thesis sought to map and analyze media perceptions of the BRI across member states of the EU 
by utilizing the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT). In doing so, this 
thesis uncovered regional divergences and negative temporal trends in media perceptions of the 
BRI across member states. In addition, introductory case studies suggested that existing 
investment, trade and governmental relations between member states and China may have an 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
China has experienced a meteoric rise in its economy since the enactment of its reform and 
opening-up policy in 1978. With tremendous pace, China has vaulted into a top economy in the 
world – ranking only behind the United States (US) in terms of nominal GDP (Lee, 2019). 
Accompanying this rise has been a sharp increase in China’s military capabilities. Since 2002, 
China’s defense expenditures have ranked second in the world – gradually narrowing the gap 
between itself and the US (China Power, 2019). These developments have registered on a global 
scale, signaling a possible challenge to the US-led liberal world order. This has direct 
implications for Europe, a longtime partner and beneficiary of this order. As a proxy 
battleground for the US-China rivalry, Europe’s strategic importance cannot be overstated 
(Kaiser, 2019). Emboldened by newfound hard power tools, China has charted a more ambitious 
and assertive foreign policy course (Mayer, 2018). Long gone are the days of keeping a low 
profile; China’s time to bide has come to pass.  
In 2013, following a leadership transition to President Xi Jinping, China launched the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – its most ambitious foreign policy project to date.1 Retracing the 
ancient Silk Road, while creating a new Maritime Silk Road, the BRI combines “the old and the 
new” (Maçães, 2019, p. 38). Ostensibly, the project is economic in nature. In order to solve 
issues of domestic overcapacity, the BRI promotes the exportation of Chinese production to a 
                                               
1 The Belt and Road Initiative was officially launched in 2013, comprised of a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st 
Century Maritime Road” (Mayer, 2018, p. 12). In its entirety, the initiative will reach roughly two thirds of the 
world’s population and over 70 countries. The BRI has gone by several names, including ‘One Belt, One Road’ and 
‘New Silk Roads’. Henceforth, this thesis will refer to the initiative as simply the BRI. 
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myriad of infrastructure projects connecting China to Europe (Xing, 2019). These include 
railways, highways, seaports, energy pipelines, and power grids to name a few. As such, the 
economic success of the BRI is paramount for Xi and the Communist Party of China (CPC). 
However, hidden behind an economic veil, the BRI is increasingly portrayed as a Chinese 
geopolitical project.2 
 According to Allison (2017), China, as subject to Thucydides’ Trap, has mounted its 
offense against the US for global hegemony along the lines of the BRI. Armed with an 
alternative development model, China’s BRI promises to unite the Eurasian landmass under a 
‘community of common destiny’. Shifting the axis of power to Asia, the BRI will ultimately 
fulfill the prophecy of famed geographer Halford Mackinder that they who rule Eurasia rule the 
world (Allison, 2017, p. 128). However, this nefarious portrayal of the BRI has been patently 
denied by China. Depicted as a win-win, the BRI is conceived as part of China’s ‘peaceful rise’. 
In reaction to Western concerns, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has repeatedly denounced the BRI as 
a tool of geopolitics. Furthermore, China has presented itself as a “new type of rising power” – 
averse to confrontation and the allure of hegemony (Godement & Kratz, 2015, p. 6).  
Against this backdrop, the ultimate success of the BRI – irrespective of true intentions – 
lies in Europe. As the endpoint of both the overland belt and maritime road, Europe is the “final 
goal and main justification” of the BRI (Maçães, 2019, p. 234). Economically, the BRI offers 
China access to the largest economy and single market in the world with the European Union 
(EU). Geopolitically, it offers potential influence over the largest grouping of developed 
countries outside of North America. As Xi’s signature foreign policy, the BRI can be understood 
                                               
2 Many studies make this argument. See, for example, Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China 
escape Thucydides's trap?. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; Mayer, M. (2018). China’s rise as Eurasian power: the 
revival of the Silk Road and its consequences. In Rethinking the Silk road (pp. 1-42). Palgrave Macmillan, 
Singapore; Maçães, B. (2019). Belt and road: A Chinese world order. Oxford University Press. 
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as a vehicle of China’s public diplomacy in Europe (Voon & Xu, 2020). Due to the sheer size, 
scale, and ambition of the BRI, it is important to analyze it as “an idea, a concept, a process, 
better captured through a metaphor, not an exact description” (Maçães, 2019, p. 43). In this way, 
the BRI can be examined at an abstract level as a loose, ever-evolving, umbrella concept rather 
than a concrete, nuts and bolts project. Through this conceptualization, the role of the media 
becomes significant. To the average observer, the BRI is distant and not easily accessible. As the 
gatekeepers of information and framers of debate, the media play a pivotal role in informing 
public opinion of the BRI. Therefore, positive media perceptions of the BRI in recipient 
countries constitute a large part of the project’s success. In the case of the EU, the burden of 
success lies at the member-state level. Taken together, media perceptions in member states have 
far-reaching consequences on collective EU policies towards Chinese investments, and China 
more broadly (Chen & Hao, 2020). If media positivity is abundant, the BRI holds promise; 
whereas if media negativity is pervasive, the BRI is jeopardized. 
High level acquisitions and takeover attempts by Chinese companies in Europe first 
grabbed headlines in 2016. In particular, China’s Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund’s failed 
takeover bid for German chip manufacturer Aixtron dominated news cycles in Europe. The 
takeover was opposed by Germany, under the urging of the US, for security related concerns 
(Sheahan, 2016). In light of the Made in China 2025 strategy, these high-tech investments raised 
further flags in Germany and Western Europe. They ignited concerns over China’s strategic 
acquisition of technologies abroad and market restrictions at home (Pieke, 2020). Nonetheless, 
perceptions have diverged in the EU’s periphery. Chinese infrastructural investments in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the South were welcomed; buoying stagnant economies and 
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spurring needed construction.3 However, concerns emerged in Western Europe over issues of 
economic independence and China’s 17 + 1 strategy (Pieke, 2020). Designed as China’s 
cooperation mechanism with the CEE countries, this has been criticized as a “divide and rule” 
strategy (Yu, 2018, p. 231). Many of these countries have also signed bilateral BRI agreements 
with China, breaking with the EU. Furthermore, in light of these recent developments, at the 
supranational level the EU has sharpened its strategy towards China and shifted its tone from 
conciliatory to confrontational (European Commission, 2019). 
Thus, divergences in perceptions of Chinese investments and economic engagements are 
apparent within the EU. Yet, most studies of European perceptions of China, or China’s 
purported soft power, have focused on public opinion polling of China’s image, role in the 
world, and influence (see Zuokui, 2017; Chen & Hao, 2020; Voon & Xu, 2020). While this 
research is helpful in gauging general European perceptions of China, it fails to offer evidence 
into specific perceptions of the BRI. As a rhetorical vehicle of China’s foreign policy, and new 
framework for investment, the BRI represents an increasingly important tool of China. As such, 
the literature has begun to analyze the BRI more specifically, with a strong emphasis on its 
economic and political implications. In particular, a focus has emerged on perceptions and 
implications in the CEE region (see Vangeli, 2017; Song & QiQi, 2017; Matura, 2018; 
Pepermans, 2018). However, this research remains limited in its generalizability to the EU as a 
whole – and only briefly engages media perceptions on a case-by-case basis. As media 
perceptions are vitally important to publics’ understanding of the BRI in the EU, they deserve 
more academic attention. To this end, this thesis seeks to map and analyze media perceptions of 
                                               
3 Of note, the state-owned China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) purchased a majority-stake in the 
Port of Piraeus, Greece in 2016. This was one of China’s most strategic, and visible, investments in Europe and acts 
as a maritime entry into Europe.  
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the BRI in the EU through a big-data analysis. Looking at varied media sources, media 
perceptions of the BRI will be aggregated to the member state level in an effort to depict media 
perceptions across member states of the EU. In doing so, this thesis is guided by agenda setting 
and framing theory which underline the importance of the media in shaping public opinion. 
Therefore, the aim of this research is to offer a preliminary analysis of regional variation in 
media perceptions of the BRI in the EU and to highlight changing media perceptions. Whether, 
and where, the BRI is perceived positively or negatively by the media has major implications 
with “the potential to either rip the EU apart or else drive Europe closer together” (Pieke, 2020, 
p. 16).  
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows. First, I will provide a theoretically informed 
literature review of existing research on perceptions of China and the BRI. More specifically, I 
will examine European public opinion of China and important economic engagements to probe 
possible regional divergences. In doing so, I will identify a gap in the literature and derive my 
main research question. Second, I will detail the theoretical foundations of this research and 
construct a causal model to situate the role of media perceptions in shaping public opinion and 
policy. Third, I will formalize my expectations for regional divergence and temporal change in 
media perceptions of the BRI through the construction of hypotheses. Fourth, I will outline the 
research design deployed in this thesis. This will include a detailed account of data collection, 
operationalization of key concepts, methodological approaches and a reflection on the 
epistemological and ontological underpinnings of my research. Fifth, I will graphically present 
the findings of my analysis and then systematically discuss outlier cases to aid in understanding. 
Lastly, I will summarize the results of my research, acknowledge its limitations, and posit 
avenues for future research.   
   6 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: STATE OF THE ART 
Due to the evolving nature of the BRI and its recency to academic debates, this state of the art 
employs a different approach to examining the literature. As the BRI is both a vehicle and result 
of China’s rise, it is crucially important to first examine it in light of the existing IR theoretical 
debates. China’s rise is assessed through the lens of neorealism, neoliberalism and 
constructivism. In doing so, rationalist theories are discarded in favor of a constructivist 
approach. Secondly, following a constructivist approach, this review surveys existing literature 
on Western perceptions of China, and its rise. US perceptions of China and its rise are briefly 
summarized, followed by a more detailed examination of the literature on European perceptions 
of China. Thirdly, existing perception literature on the BRI is presented. Lastly, this review will 
conclude with a determination of the gap in the literature, which serves as the basis of my 
research question.  
2.1 China’s Rise and IR Theory  
China’s rise has been a key topic of  international relations (IR) scholarship throughout the 21st 
century. Beset by debates over the reality of China’s rise, researchers have fallen into one of two 
camps. The first, posits that in relation to China, the US is in a state of decline and is falling ill to 
the cyclical nature of power and hegemony (Beckley, 2011). All great powers come to an end; 
succeeded by the rising great power of the day. China, much like the 20th century US, has come 
of age and is ready to lead a new world order. The second camp simply rejects these claims. 
Unlike past fallen world leaders, the US possesses unparalleled geopolitical power (Wohlforth, 
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1999; Beckley, 2011). Armored with superior military and economic capabilities, the US will 
long remain the global hegemon.4 
 Departing from basic debates over American decline and Chinese ascent, IR theorizing 
has focused on the implications of China’s rise within the international political realm. The three 
main contemporary schools of IR – neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism – all offer 
distinct perspectives on China’s rise and impose structure on debates concerning its 
consequences. As IR’s dominant theoretical school, neorealism has much to say about the rise of 
China within the international system. At its most basic level, neorealists hold that states are 
locked in an anarchic system plagued by conflictual relations (Donnelly, 2013). States, as the 
main actors in the international sphere, are guided by self-interests that pit them against one 
another in a fight for survival. Therefore, issues of power distribution predominate (Waltz, 
1979). As such, China’s rise in economic and military capabilities shifts the balance of power 
and poses challenges to the US-led world order. To offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, this 
spells direct confrontation. “To put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully” (Mearsheimer, 2010, 
p. 382). In an attempt to preserve its own security, China will seek regional hegemony to pacify 
its neighbors and expand its power. Understood as a vehicle for China’s expanding foreign 
policy, the BRI is seen by offensive realists as a tool of China’s growing assertiveness.  
Where offensive realists see conflict as inevitable, defensive realists find retreat in 
China’s peaceful rise narrative. In this strand of neorealism, “intentions are important in 
analyzing state behavior” (Chen, 2016, p. 63). Adherents such as Charles Glaser (2010) believe 
                                               
4 For an introduction into the arguments for the US’ insurmountable military and economic power see Beckley, M. 
(2011). China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure. International Security, 41-78; Brooks, S. G., & 
Wohlforth, W. C. (2016). The rise and fall of the great powers in the twenty- first century: China's rise and the fate 
of America's global position. International Security, 40(3), 7-53; Starrs, S. (2013). American economic power hasn't 
declined—it globalized! Summoning the data and taking globalization seriously. International studies quarterly, 
57(4), 817-830. 
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that if China can successfully signal its peaceful intentions, then they will quell fears and avoid 
serious confrontations (p. 272-274). In doing so, looming security dilemmas are stifled and 
conflict avoided. However, both of these neorealist accounts suffer from preoccupations with 
power and security. Constrained by narrow conceptions of states’ interests, neorealism cannot 
make sense of the fundamental economic and social aspects of the BRI. As a mode of economic 
and political cooperation, the BRI must be analyzed beyond the narrow confines of realist 
thought.  
 Moving from conflict to cooperation, neoliberalism views the rise of China more 
optimistically. At the heart of neoliberalism is a belief that states are concerned with maximizing 
their “absolute gains” (Burchill, 2013, p. 67). States assess their gains independently from one 
another; thus, they are more willing to cooperate and share in mutual benefits. This creates an 
international atmosphere of interdependence that inextricably links states’ fates.5 Of most 
importance, neoliberals believe in the power of economic interdependence to constrain conflict. 
In the case of China, increased trade and investments between itself and global markets, foremost 
in the US, play an outsized role in “constraining and damping any tendencies toward conflict” 
(Friedberg, 2005, p. 13). Moreover, China’s participation in an array of international institutions 
further constrains its behavior (Burchill, 2013). Conceived as a tool of economic cooperation and 
a means to fulfill needs of domestic overcapacity, the BRI is seen by neoliberals as an 
opportunity for expanded interdependence and absolute gains for partner countries. Joseph Nye 
(2017) has suggested as much, encouraging the US to embrace the BRI and signaling its 
potential to produce global public goods. Yet, this account fails to calibrate for ideational 
                                               
5 The origin of neoliberal concepts such as ‘complex interdependence’ and ‘cooperation’ can be found in the early 
works of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. See, for example, Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. (1977). Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown; Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
   9 
backlash. While states may stand to gain from BRI facilitated economic cooperation, they are 
often constrained by their domestic publics. In light of the geopolitical concerns raised around 
the BRI, it cannot be simply understood through neoliberalist notions of economic 
interdependence.  
 Lastly, rounding out the core schools of contemporary IR, constructivism diverges from 
the rationalist foundations of both neorealism and neoliberalism. In doing so, constructivists 
deploy ideational and normative factors in the analysis of international relations (Reus-Smit, 
2013).6 Moving beyond objective material debates, they elevate subjective non-material factors 
such as identity, beliefs and values. Thus, the interests of states are malleable and subject to 
change through processes of socialization. In regard to China’s rise, constructivists tend to have 
an optimistic outlook. China’s increased participation and membership in international 
institutions show a desire to be accepted into the international liberal fold (Friedberg, 2005, p. 
36). Furthermore, these structured interactions serve to condition China’s beliefs and shared 
identity. In this way, China’s rise can be seen as peaceful and within the confines of the existing 
liberal world order. However, the BRI presents challenges to this line of constructivist thought.  
 Seen as an alternative to the Washington Consensus, the BRI promotes China’s state-led, 
illiberal form of development. Through this promotion of alternative modes of development, 
China is crafting its normative power and legitimizing its ascendance (Zhou & Esteban, 2018, p. 
490). Therefore, a process by which China socializes foreign partners is at play; not a process in 
which China is socialized by the existing liberal order. In this way, the BRI represents China’s 
evolving identity and interest in a new world order. Yet, this systemic view of constructivism 
                                               
6 In contrast to existing theories of Realism and Liberalism, Constructivism became popularized following the end 
of the Cold War. For more information on the theory’s roots, and pretensions, see Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is 
what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International organization, 46(2), 391-425; Wendt, 
A. (1999). Social theory of international politics (Vol. 67). Cambridge University Press. 
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discounts the role of foreign publics in interpreting China’s rise and the BRI. At a unit-level, 
constructivism privileges domestic actors, publics and discourses in determining national 
interests and policies (Chen, 2016). Unlike systemic constructivism, unit-level constructivism 
specifically focuses on the relationship between domestic norms and subsequent state interests 
(Reus-Smit, 2013). So, it follows that countries’ perceptions of China and its policies are, in part, 
domestically conceived. How China, and the BRI, are perceived domestically has an effect on 
states’ policies towards China. As previously stated, the ultimate success and path forward for 
the BRI is heavily dependent on the positive perceptions of foreign partners. Consequently, unit-
level analyses are necessitated as they enable “the explanation of variations of identity, interest 
and action across states” (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 228). In the case of the EU, these variations are 
seen across member states and are best examined through a constructivist lens, particularly one 
that highlights domestic actors. Therefore, it is at this level of analysis that this thesis proceeds.  
2.2 Western Perceptions of China’s Rise 
China has actively acknowledged the need to manage its image and soft power as a rising power 
(Huang & Ding, 2006; Wuthnow, 2008). In following, this section will survey constructivist 
accounts of China’s rise through Western eyes. A sub-section of the literature has focused on the 
perceptions of China’s rise in foreign publics. As a whole, this line of research has been rather 
limited and with a narrow emphasis on public opinion polling.7 However, when available, the 
literature has tended to be divided regionally. For the purposes of this thesis, US perceptions of 
China will be briefly explored,8 followed by a more detailed account of European perceptions. In 
                                               
7 Of note, the Pew Global Attitudes Project and Chicago Council on Global Affairs produced early surveys 
evaluating China’s favorability, economic growth and world role (Nelson, Carlson, 2012). However, their sample 
sizes remain small and under representative, topics remain vague, and surveying is infrequent.  
8 While US perceptions of China are not directly related to the questions of this thesis, they do play an indirect role 
in influencing European perceptions of China through issues of world-order and hegemony.  
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doing so, European perceptions will be examined regionally in an effort to establish regional 
divergence.  
In the US, after an initial ‘pivot to Asia’ under President Obama – relations have 
devolved into overt hostility and an escalating trade war under President Trump.9 However, at a 
unit-level, Xie and Page (2010) found earlier evidence of perceived threats of China’s rise in 
America through survey data.10 In 2008, Americans recognized China as the world’s second 
most influential country behind the US. In addition, they perceived China’s newfound influence 
with apprehension – citing issues of national security and economics. These findings were 
furthered by Aldrich, Lu, and Kang (2015), who utilized survey data from 2010.11 They found 
that Americans continued to perceive China as an influential world power, but one that avoids its 
international responsibilities (Aldrich et al., 2015, p. 210). In more recent 2019 polling, the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project found 60% of Americans to have unfavorable opinions of China – the 
question’s highest recorded percentage (Silver, Devlin & Huang, 2019).  
Yet, in Europe, perceptions of China have been more complex and slower to evolve. At 
the supranational level, The European Commission (EC) only recently labeled China a “strategic 
competitor” and “systemic rival” (European Commission, 2019, pp. 1, 5). In addition, amid 
increasing worries about the influence of Chinese investment, the EU recently adopted a new 
framework for screening FDI. This screening mechanism was initially proposed and tabled in 
2017 – but has since gained consensus (EC, 2019). Whereas, at the member-state level, Zuokui 
                                               
 
9 This was a minority view at the level of US Grand Strategy before roughly 2016-2018. For an example of shifting 
views from opportunity to threat, see Blackwill, R. D., & Tellis, A. J. (2015). Revising US grand strategy toward 
China. Council on Foreign Relations. 
 
10 The authors used survey data collected by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in both 2006 and 2008.  
 
11 The authors designed and utilized the Americans’ Attitudes toward China Survey (AACS), conducted by the 
Center for Survey Research at Indiana University (Aldrich et al., 2015). 
   12 
(2017) identified negative trends in European perceptions of China through survey data.12 Most 
Europeans “believed that China’s growing military and economic power posed more of a threat 
or increasing threats,” as opposed to an opportunity (Zuokui, 2017, p. 219). Furthermore, he 
outlined regional divides in perceptions of China. Taken as a whole, a clear divergence emerged 
between Western European countries and CEE countries. In the West negative views abounded, 
while in the East more positive views took hold (Zuokui, 2017). This regional divide has been 
further substantiated through China’s 17 + 1 strategy, and recent trends in Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  
In light of China’s recent engagements with CEE through its 17 + 1 strategy and the BRI, 
research into China-CEE relations has increased. As a cooperative mechanism between China 
and CEE, the 17 + 1 strategy has been portrayed as a win-win by Chinese officials (Pepermans, 
2018). The CEE region, enticed by the potential economic gains and needed investment, jumped 
at the opportunity. Designed to facilitate connectivity and cooperation between the two parties, 
the strategy also offers China inroads to the EU. The 17 + 1 strategy’s goals are closely aligned, 
and increasingly intertwined, with those of the BRI. Chinese officials have even explicitly linked 
the two; synergizing their efforts in CEE region (Pepermans, 2018). Furthermore, as of 2019, all 
17 CEE countries had officially signaled support for the BRI (Pavlićević, 2018).13 As such, these 
countries have a more vested interest in cooperative relations with China.  
Much like the CEE region, and evidenced by Greece’s membership in the 17 + 1 
framework, Southern Europe has also welcomed Chinese engagement and investment. While 
                                               
12 Zuokui (2017) compiled and examined a multitude of surveys in his analysis of European perceptions of China. 
“The author mainly derived data from surveys conducted by the American agency Pew, the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, the British BBC and the Canadian Globescan,” (Zuokui, 2017, p. 202). Due to the summative 
and comparative nature of Zuokui’s (2017) study, it will serve as a guide to public opinion throughout this section. 
 
13 The strategy was initially labelled the “16 + 1” strategy and only included CEE countries. As of 2019, Greece 
joined this cooperative framework – although regionally it is considered part of the Southern European bloc.  
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Zuokui (2017) found Southern Europeans to have less generalizable opinions towards China, 
major investment projects in Greece and Portugal signal more positive relations. The majority 
purchase of Greece’s Port of Piraeus and Portugal’s public electricity grid by Chinese State-
Owned Enterprises (SOE) display significant economic cooperation and potential for Chinese 
influence (Seaman, Huotari & Otero-Iglesias, 2017). In addition, Italy’s formal endorsement of 
the BRI in March of 2019 signaled a positive development in the region (Le Corre, 2019). This 
endorsement is particularly significant given Italy’s previous public rebuke, in conjunction with 
France and Germany, of growing Chinese investment and influence in Europe (Chazan, 2017).  
In contrast, according to Zuokui (2017), Western Europeans have amassed relatively 
pessimistic opinions of China.14 Additionally, Western European countries have been more 
outspoken in their concerns about China’s rise and influence in Europe. Home to larger and more 
industrially and technologically advanced economies, Western Europe is the workhorse of the 
EU’s single market. As China has risen in the global economy, so has its ambition to move to 
into higher-value production chains. Captured through its Made in China 2025 strategy, China 
has embarked on an innovation-driven upscale of its manufacturing industry (Cai, 2017). This 
strategy has put China in direct competition, and conflict, with production superpowers in 
Germany and greater Western Europe. In addition, concerns over China’s strategic high-tech 
acquisitions and limited domestic market access have fueled Western discontent. These negative 
views have compounded through increasing pressures from the US to oppose Chinese takeovers 
for security related concerns (Sheahan, 2016). This all amounts to an increasing tide of negativity 
towards Chinese investments and economic engagements in Western Europe.  
                                               
14 These findings were widespread across Western Europe, with the exception of the United Kingdom (UK). In light 
of the UK’s departure from the EU, these generalized negative opinions towards China in Western Europe hold even 
more firmly (Zuokui, 2017). 
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Lastly, and closely related, Northern Europeans have been equally, if not more so, 
apprehensive towards China as Western Europeans. While the Nordic countries are linked 
economically with China as trading partners,15 they have long been at odds over issues of human 
rights and democracy. According to Bøje Forsby (2019), Nordic public opinion of China has 
deteriorated recently in light of China’s growing assertive, and illiberal, regime. These negative 
sentiments towards China have been most prominently displayed in Sweden, home to the 
region’s largest economy and population. Swedish-Chinese feuds have been widely covered in 
major media outlets, headlined by a slew of diplomatic spars related to publisher Gui Minhai, a 
Chinese-born Swedish national.16 Furthermore, Northern European’s high value, technological 
industries are in direct competition with China’s Made in China 2025 strategy. In short, much 
like Western Europe, Northern Europe has developed increasingly negative opinions towards 
China and Chinese investment. 
2.3 Perceptions of the BRI 
While the above review explored European perceptions of China broadly through the lenses of 
public opinion and economic engagement, there has been far less academic literature to date 
specifically targeting perceptions of the BRI. This is acutely evident at the European level, where 
research remains sparse and narrowly focused on the CEE region. In following the structure of 
existing research, this section will briefly explore perception literature at the global level 
followed by the regional level. 
                                               
15 China is the second-largest trading partner for all Nordic nations outside of Europe, and its stake as a trading 
partner has increased in all Nordic countries since 2009 with the exception of Finland (Bøje Forsby, 2019, p. 3) 
 
16 See https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/china-tries-to-put-sweden-on-ice/ and 
https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/02/20/how-sweden-copes-with-chinese-bullying. 
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 At the global level, several studies specifically assessed perceptions of the BRI in foreign 
countries. The two most extensive of such studies were based on international survey data and 
online news interactions. Voon and Xu (2020) utilized international survey data in combination 
with Chinese outward direct investment (ODI) data to assess the impact of BRI investment on 
China’s soft power.17 China’s soft power was operationalized through a positive to negative scale 
of public opinion of China. They found that ODI had a statistically insignificant effect on 
countries’ opinions of China, and thus China’s soft power. Whereas Cheng (2018), focused 
solely on accumulating perception data on the BRI globally. In doing so, he analyzed BRI 
perceptions through online news interactions and survey data. Cheng (2018) found that 
perceptions generally reflected a balancing of the risks and rewards that come with the BRI, 
specifically in potential infrastructure gains and possible dependency on China (Cheng, 2018).  
 Regionally, BRI perception literature is heavily concentrated in Asia – particularly India. 
Perceptions of the BRI in India are highly sought out as it occupies a strategic position along, 
and potential roadblock for, the BRI. The importance of India is evidenced by the multitude of 
studies probing its perspectives (Jacob, 2017; Hu, 2017; Sachdeva, 2018). For the most part, 
these studies look at elite perceptions of the BRI through interviews with academics, politicians, 
business people, and more. They also engage in debates over the challenges and opportunities 
that the BRI presents India. Beyond India, several studies focused on perceptions of the BRI in 
Central Asia (Pantucci & Lain, 2016; Chen & Jiménez-Tovar, 2017; Valkulchuk & Overland, 
2019). These studies utilized student surveys, elite interviews and case studies to assess the state 
of perceptions of China, and the BRI, in Central Asia. However, this research was largely 
                                               
17 The public opinion data was collected from the Program on International Policy Attitudes, the BBC World 
Service Globescan, and the Pew Research Center. Chinese investment data was collected from China’s Bureau of 
Statistics.  
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focused on analyzing changing perceptions of China in the region. The BRI was used as a tool 
for understanding changing perceptions of China in Central Asia, and was not the main 
analytical focus of these studies. In other words, the BRI was not studied on its own. Overall, 
this research demonstrated the growing influence of China in the region – but found that publics 
had little knowledge of the BRI. 
 Lastly, at the end of the road, literature on perceptions of the BRI in Europe focused 
mainly on the CEE region. Several studies probed China’s usage of the BRI as a new strategy for 
cooperation with the CEE through cultural diplomacy, diplomatic dialogue and policy 
coordination (Vangeli, 2017; Song & QiQi, 2017; Pepermans, 2018). These studies investigated 
the economic and political implications of the BRI in the CEE region, along with the impact that 
these closer relations had on China’s soft power in the region. At a more targeted level, Matura 
(2018) explored media discourses on the BRI in Hungary and Slovakia to investigate public 
opinion. His findings suggested that the BRI had low salience in the two countries, and when 
available the coverage was mostly neutral in its portrayal. Beyond Vergeron’s (2018) summative 
discussion of European perceptions of the BRI, a rigorous EU-wide member state assessment of 
perceptions of the BRI was absent from the literature. 
2.4 Research Gap and Question 
Through this review two gaps in the literature are illuminated. First, the academic literature 
exploring perceptions and public opinion of the BRI is still in its infancy – with more 
comprehensive studies only published recently (see Cheng, 2018; Voon & Xu, 2020). This gap 
was anticipated and grounds for writing this thesis, however, it was important to illustrate the 
underdeveloped nature of existing research. Second, existing perception literature on the BRI 
remains focused on Central Asia (see Pantucci & Lain, 2016; Chen & Jiménez-Tovar, 2017; 
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Valkulchuk & Overland, 2019). When research was conducted on Europe specifically, the CEE 
region garnered the most attention due in large part to its existing cooperation framework with 
China (17 + 1). Although these studies offered generalizable findings to the CEE region, they 
offered little insight into perceptions of the BRI at the EU-wide level (see Matura, 2018). This 
lack of a system-wide understanding of how the BRI is perceived poses a problem for 
understanding current, and future, collective EU policy towards Chinese FDI. This is because the 
EU maintains exclusive responsibility over trade policy, of which FDI is included, and the 
Council of the EU requires unanimity in decision making (Puccio, 2016).18 Since the BRI 
operates as a unique form of Chinese FDI, divergences in member state perceptions of the BRI 
could present challenges to collective EU trade policy. 
 In order to tackle these gaps, this research employs a constructivist research agenda 
aimed at mapping perceptions of the BRI across the EU by answering the following research 
question: 
 
RQ: “To what extent, if at all, is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) perceived differently 
by domestic audiences in member states of the European Union (EU) and have these 
perceptions changed recently?” 
 
 
At its core, this is a descriptive question designed to explore relevant empirical data that offer 
insights into perceptions of the BRI across member states. However, this thesis does not wish to 
merely fulfill this descriptive function. Therefore, this research also analyzes variation, regional 
divergence and temporal issues of perceptions of the BRI in the EU, as elaborated in the 
following three sub-questions: 
 
                                               
18 See this briefing for more detailed information on EU trade procedures by Puccio, L. (2016). A guide to EU 
procedures for the conclusion of international trade agreements. European Parliamentary Research Service. 
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1: “To what extent is the BRI perceived differently across EU member states?” 
 
2: “To what extent do these perceptions diverge regionally?” 
 
3: “To what extent have these perceptions changed over time?” 
 
 
These sub-questions relate to general variation and regional divergence within the EU, as well as 
the recently highlighted changing perceptions of China, and its image, in the EU. In particular, 
these questions are explored in light of increasing polarity around Chinese foreign investment 
and economic engagement in the EU. While public debate in the EU has emphasized recent 
changing, and more negative, perceptions of China and the BRI, there has yet to be a systematic 
analysis of change. As a first step towards better understanding these changes, we must identify 
where changes in perception of the BRI are salient in the EU. Once these trends are identified 
and mapped, then more complex causal research can be conducted.  
 In order to tackle these research questions, this thesis approaches the study of perception 
from a big-data perspective. Moving beyond opinion polling, expert surveying and case studies, 
domestic perceptions will be analyzed through media discourses. Through developments in 
computational social science, it is possible to aggregate and analyze tone in media sources across 
the EU. These innovative tools advance perception research and allow for the aggregation of 
media perceptions across the EU at a massive scale not attainable through traditional research 
databases. This approach will be further detailed in the subsequent research design section.19  
 
                                               
19 For a primer on text and sentiment analysis in political science see Wilkerson, J., & Casas, A. (2017). Large-scale 
computerized text analysis in political science: Opportunities and challenges. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 20, 529-544.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Through the course of the previous state of the art, this thesis explored multiple theoretical 
perspectives in studying the rise of China, and more specifically the BRI. Given the main focus 
of this research, perceptions, this thesis will discard rationalist theories of realism and 
neoliberalism in favor of constructivism. Domestic actors and audiences will be privileged as 
modes of policy generation – opening up the black box of states. At the heart of this approach is 
an attention to a state’s general public, or citizenry. As the EU is home to 27 democracies,20 the 
interests and opinions of member state publics often act as constraining factors on EU action. 
Long gone are the days of insulated elite decision-making dependent on functional pressures. 
Rather, issues of Europe have entered the domestic realm – vaulting national interests and 
politics into EU decision-making (Hooghe & Marks, 2009).21 Therefore the BRI, as an issue of 
Europe, is in part reliant on the positive perceptions of the project held in the general publics of 
member states. These perceptions can ultimately constrain or aid the successful implementation 
and expansion of the BRI in the EU.  
However, the previous section also highlighted that existing European perception 
research is mostly centered on China’s image, and questions are not formulated specifically 
                                               
20 While not all democracies are created equally in the EU, for the purposes of this thesis I am generalizing all EU 
member states as democracies. According to the Economist’s Democracy Index 2019, all EU member states are 
classified as either “full democracies” or “flawed democracies” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). Therefore, 
future causal studies can, and should, disaggregate the term democracy and probe the subsequent effect on framing 
and media sentiment. 
 
21 While envisioned originally as a means for understanding European integration, Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) 
theory of Postfuntionalism and the concept of a ‘constraining dissensus’ can be applied to the BRI in the EU. The 
valuation of identity, public opinion and national politics in Postfunctionalsim as drivers of EU-wide policy hews 
closely to the tenets of constructivism. National interests, guided in part by identity and public opinion, matter. 
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around perceptions of the BRI. This absence is most noticeable in public opinion polling, where 
EU respondents have yet to be asked directly about their attitudes towards the BRI. Therefore, 
research must be redirected to other domestic actors that offer insight into the perceptions of the 
public. As the gatekeepers of public information, and framers of debate, the media are a natural 
proxy. In following this logic, it is important to theoretically establish the relationship between 
the media, the public and policy. The first two parts of this section will detail agenda setting and 
framing theory respectively, while the third part constructs the relationship between the media, 
public opinion, policy and the BRI.  
3.1 Constructivism and Agenda-setting Theory 
Constructivism and agenda-setting theory have a close, but often implicit, relationship as they 
both deal in the transformative power of ideas and interests (Saurugger, 2016). At a foundational 
level, constructivists hold that reality is socially constructed. However, the process of 
socialization is often assumed in constructivist thought, while microprocesses of socialization are 
left underexplained (Johnston, 2014). “Somehow it is thought to be enough to point to the 
existence of cultural norms and corresponding behavior without showing how norms get inside 
actors’ heads to motivate actions” (Wendt, 1999, p. 134). Agenda-setting operates within this 
gap identified by Wendt, by exploring the connections between media and public opinion. 
“The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” 
(Lippmann, 1946, p. 29). In filling this void, the media has a long history of structuring the 
public’s reality around key issues and topics (McCombs, 2014). This role of the media has come 
to be known as agenda-setting (McCombs, 2014). As a curator of news, the media transfers the 
salience of issues and events to the general public. Therefore, “the media agenda sets the public 
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agenda” (McCombs, 2014, p. 23). In short, the media orients the public’s attention to topics that 
they deem newsworthy. Thus, cultivating a distilled reality of the world. 
 Agenda-setting is predicated on people’s psychological need for orientation. In new 
environments, humans have an innate need to understand and make sense of the world around 
them (McCombs, 2014). As with any environment, the political realm often necessitates 
orientation. In fact, this necessitation is particularly acute when dealing with issues of foreign 
affairs. In agenda-setting, foreign affairs and international politics are classified as ‘unobtrusive’ 
issues (McCombs, 2014). These issues, in contrast to ‘obtrusive’ issues, are not experienced on a 
personal level and remain abstract. As a result, people commonly rely on the media as their 
“primary source of orientation” and tool for understanding unobtrusive issues (McCombs, 2014, 
p. 126).  
Seen as an unobtrusive issue to foreign publics, the salience of the BRI is subject to the 
media’s agenda-setting power. In the EU, only a select few countries are official partners of the 
BRI and projects to date have a relatively small geographic footprint. Moreover, there is a 
potential disconnect between a person’s experience with a specific BRI-related project, and their 
understanding of the BRI as whole. Therefore, the general public is most likely formally 
introduced to the BRI through the media.  
3.2 Attribute Agenda-setting and Framing Theory 
While the agenda-setting function of the media may tell the public what to think about, it is 
framing that tells them what to think (Cohen, 2015). At the primary level, the media sets the 
public agenda through its selection of newsworthy issues. However, at the secondary level, the 
media can also influence perceptions of these issues (McCombs, 2014). Through presentation 
and portrayal, the media provides meaning and interpretative frames for unfolding events (Chong 
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& Druckman, 2007). In this thesis, this process is explored through both attribute agenda-setting 
and framing theory.22 
 Taken together, these theories are premised on the idea that the objects, or issues, that the 
media directs attention to can be viewed through various perspectives. These perspectives are 
formed by the attributes and frames associated with the objects. Attributes are “those 
characteristics and properties that fill out the picture of each object,” whereas frames are “the key 
considerations emphasized in a speech act,” (McCombs, 2014, p. 76; Chong & Druckman, 2007, 
p. 106). Frames and attributes used by the media inform and shape public opinion surrounding an 
object. Once again, this second order effect of agenda-setting is greater in situations where 
publics have a higher need for orientation (McCombs, 2014). 
 In the case of the BRI as an object, the need for orientation is high. As an issue of 
international politics, the public is not only introduced to the BRI through the media, but also 
influenced by its portrayal. The attributes and frames employed by the media in its presentation 
of the BRI play a role in the subsequent perceptions of the public. In this way, media framing 
represents a microprocess within constructivism that assigns meaning to the BRI and gets “inside 
actors’ heads” (Wendt, 1999, p. 134). Of course, this only holds true if “both the political system 
and the mass media are reasonably open and free” (McCombs, 2014, p. 81). If a country is not 
democratic and the media not free, then publics are sidelined. 
                                               
22 There is a debate among agenda-setting and framing academics about whether the two concepts are synonymous, 
related, or completely distinct from one another. For the purposes of this thesis, I do not attempt to engage that 
debate, but rather explore both concepts as a means to explain the media’s role in shaping perceptions of the BRI in 
Europe. For more information on this debate see chapter three in McCombs, M. E. (2014). Setting the agenda: The 
Mass Media and Public Opinion (Second ed.). Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
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3.3 Media, BRI, Public Opinion and Policy 
Now that a relationship between the media, publics and opinion has been examined a subsequent 
connection to policy can be explored. In democratic systems, the preferences of the electorate are 
fundamental to representation (Wlezien & Soroka, 2016). Moreover, these preferences should be 
reflected in the policy making process. Research has established this relationship and shown 
public opinion to be a proximate cause of policy (Page & Shapiro, 1983). In short, the opinions 
of the public serve “to motivate actions” and spur policy creation (Wendt, 1999, p. 134). While 
public opinion may affect policy, this finding should not be taken definitively as public opinion 
is just one of several other impactful independent variables (Page & Shapiro, 1983). 
 In summarizing the aforementioned theoretical concepts, Figure 1 outlines a causal 
mechanism for understanding key concepts as they relate to the BRI. In the first step, the media 
frames the BRI through its portrayal and develops perceptions. In general, these frames promote 
either negative (a) or positive (b) media perceptions of the BRI. This initial step is the main 
analytical focus of this thesis, and the basis upon which the research design is developed. Steps 
two through five remain outside of the scope of this analysis, but are included to highlight the 
relevance of analyzing the first step in greater detail. Therefore, the second step demonstrates the 
effect that media perceptions have on public opinion of the BRI. Third, public opinion, formed in 
part based on media perceptions, has a proximate causal effect on policy-makers and policies 
directed at the BRI (Cheng, 2018). Lastly, steps four and five signal the role of the media in 
providing resources to policy-makers and publics to form opinions on the BRI (Cheng, 2018). In 
short, analyzing step one in this causal mechanism serves as a springboard for further research 
into the role of the media in influencing the outcome of the BRI in the EU.  
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Figure 1 
Causal Mechanism between the Media, BRI, Public Opinion and Policy 
 
Note. Adapted from “Public Opinions on the Belt and Road Initiative: A Cross-Cultural Study,” in The Belt & Road 
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CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESES 
Given the anecdotal evidence presented thus far that perceptions of the BRI in the EU diverge 
regionally and have soured recently, this section briefly formalizes these expectations through 
the construction of hypotheses. As this is not strictly a hypothesis-testing thesis, but more 
exploratory and descriptive, the hypotheses presented here will serve simply as explications of 
the expected media perceptions of the BRI as previously detailed in the state of the art and theory 
sections.  
 First, it is hypothesized that there is in fact a divergence of media perceptions of the BRI 
regionally within the EU. This expectation stems from regional strategies for Chinese-European 
cooperation seen in the 17 + 1 strategy, existing divergences in public opinion towards China 
within the EU, and varying acceptance and apprehension towards Chinese investment in Europe. 
Furthermore, it is expected that these divergences will highlight more negative perceptions of the 
BRI in the North and West of Europe, compared to the rest of the EU.  
 
H1: Media Perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will diverge regionally 
within the EU, with Northwestern Europe averaging more negative perceptions compared 
to Central, Eastern and Southern Europe.  
 
 
Second, it is hypothesized that there is a temporal aspect to media perceptions of the BRI 
in the EU. With the EC’s recent harder-line stance towards China, and their coordinated effort to 
screen FDI, a negative trend in media perception of the BRI is hypothesized. Moreover, Western 
European apprehension towards, and disapproval of, Chinese investments and high-tech 
takeovers has been exacerbated by programs such as Made in China 2025 and the BRI. These 
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Chinese initiatives directly challenge the region’s preeminence in high-value production and 
high-tech industries. As such, it is expected that the most drastic negative turns in perception 
towards the BRI will be seen in the advanced economies of the North and West of Europe.  
 
H2: Media Perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the EU, as a whole, have 




These expectations, as formulated through the above hypotheses, will be assessed and 













   27 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to tackle the research question(s) posed, and to assess my hypotheses, this thesis 
employs a big-data research approach. This section will depart from scholarly and theoretical 
debates by collecting the necessary data to operationalize key concepts. In following, the process 
of data collection is outlined and then variables are operationalized. Lastly, the chosen research 
methods will be expounded upon, limitations acknowledged and epistemological and ontological 
issues discussed.  
5.1 Data Collection 
The previous section established that the concept of perception will be examined through the lens 
of media portrayal of the BRI. As depicted in Figure 1, the perceptions of the BRI will be 
measured at the first step in the proposed causal mechanism. Following the lead of García-
Herrero and Xu’s (2019) working paper, the ‘tone’ feature of the Global Database of Events, 
Language and Tone (GDELT) will be used to construct a measure of media perception of the 
BRI in the EU. GDELT is an open-source platform that monitors and documents tens of 
thousands of online news websites from around the world (Hopp, Schaffer, Fisher & Weber, 
2019). This data is monitored in 65 languages and updated every 15 minutes. Through deep 
learning algorithms and natural language processing, GDELT harnesses big data to “extract more 
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than 300 categories of events, millions of themes and thousands of emotions” from global media 
coverage (Computing on The Entire World section, para. 1).23  
  As a matter of technical analysis, GDELT is accessible to users through two main 
methods. The first method, and most advanced, operates in tandem with Google’s BigQuery 
database for large, complex, analyses. The second method, and most user-friendly, operates 
through an application programming interface (API) called GDELT Summary. While the first 
method enables queries dating back to 1979, it is restricted to keywords available in the GDELT 
library. Whereas the second method only enables queries dating back to 2017, but it has no 
restrictions on keyword queries. The GDELT library only tracks a certain number of events and 
concepts and the BRI is not yet included in this repository, therefore it is necessary to utilize 
GDELT Summary in this analysis (García-Herrero & Xu, 2019). In doing so, the following 
query was executed for all 27 EU member states: 
 
𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑇('()*+,-.(.)	=	"One	Belt	One	Road"	+	"Belt	and	Road"	+	"New	Silk	Road"  24 
 
 
𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐿𝑇(CDE(	*(,DFG)	 = (01 − 01 − 2017)	𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ	(12 − 31 − 2019)		25 
  
 
This produced a series of data for each member state that contained the total count per day of 
articles containing at least one of the key phrases, along with their calculated ‘tonal’ scores. In 
                                               
23 As GDELT is an online database, it primarily monitors global online news coverage. However, it does not yet 
offer robust social media monitoring. For more information about the GDELT Project and their global database visit 
https://www.gdeltproject.org/. Original academic citation of the project is found under Leetaru & Schrodt (2013). 
 
24 GDELT Summary only allows queries that include words or phrases, therefore abbreviations like OBOR and BRI 
are not included. 
 
25 The last day of 2019 was selected as the end date of the GDELT query for two reasons. First, at the time of this 
writing the year 2020 is only halfway complete and thus would not allow for a yearly average. Second, the first half 
of 2020 has been consumed by the outbreak of COVID-19 which was first identified in Wuhan, China. This fact 
may serve as a confounding variable in a time series study of perceptions of the BRI, and remains beyond the scope 
of this article. 
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order to create yearly tonal averages, article scores were aggregated and averaged at the country 














The first step depicts the calculation of tone per article as defined by GDELT. A tonal score is 
calculated for the entire article by subtracting the number of words with negative sentiment from 
the number of words with positive sentiment, and then dividing by the total word count of the 
article.26 In the second step, an average tonal score by country is calculated by summing the 
scores of all articles in a country, and then dividing by the total article count of that country.  
 In total, the data collected from GDELT amounts to three years’ worth of media tonal 
scores towards the BRI for all EU member states, from which the key concepts of this thesis can 
be operationalized. It is important to note that GDELT does not make distinctions between the 
news sources it tracks, rather it crowdsources all available online news. Therefore, the media 
tonal scores are all-encompassing averages of news found on the web.  
5.2 Operationalization 
In this thesis, the main concept of interest is media perception. As established, perception will be 
explored through media portrayal of the BRI in the EU. With the data collected from GDELT, 
media perception can be operationalized through member state tonal scores. Therefore, this 
                                               
26 It should be noted that the tonal score corresponds to the sentiment of the entire article, not specifically the 
sentence a keyphrase is embedded.  
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concept will be assessed on a scale ranging from the most negative tonal score (-100) to the most 
positive tonal score (100).  
 In addition to examining media perceptions on the whole in the EU, this thesis seeks to 
test and identify regional divergences. As alluded to in the state of the art, a distinction in 
regional perceptions towards the BRI is hypothesized. However, much like defining the 
boundaries of Europe, dividing the EU into regions is a contentious undertaking. For the 
purposes of this thesis, regional divisions will be made with respect to Chinese cooperative 
frameworks and geographic location. These are predicated on China’s explicit emphasis on 
regionalization and its subsequent differentiated strategic approach to development based on 
regions through the BRI (NDRC, 2015; Chang & Pieke, 2018). Therefore, CEE will represent 
one region comprised of Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – all of which are partners in China’s 17 + 1 initiative. 
Northwestern Europe27 will represent the second region comprised of Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden.28 Lastly, 
Southern Europe will represent the third region comprised of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal and Spain. In short, regional divergence will be measured through differences in 
averaged tonal scores in three sub-EU regions: CEE, Northwestern Europe, and Southern 
Europe. Tonal scores are averaged across regions in an effort to mirror the equal voting weight 
held by all member states in the Council of the EU. 
                                               
27 While the case could be made for a distinction between Northern and Western Europe, for both geographic and 
economic reasons directly related to the BRI, these regions will be analyzed as a whole under the umbrella of 
Northwestern Europe.  
 
28 The United Kingdom (UK) is left out of this analysis as formal proceedings to withdraw from the EU began in 
March 2017, with official withdrawal occurring on January 31, 2020. While technically a member of the EU during 
the duration of the time period data was gathered (2017-2019), conclusions drawn in this thesis are mainly relevant 
for future action and policies involving the EU, BRI and China – of which the UK will not be a participant.  
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Finally, this thesis seeks to explore temporal changes in media perception. Given the data 
collected from GDELT, temporal change will be measured across yearly tonal averages. 
Complete data for the years 2017, 2018 and 2019 are available for comparison. While a longer 
timeline of data would be preferable, this three-year span of GDELT data still adequately 
introduces trends in media perceptions towards China across the EU member states. 
5.3 Methodology 
This thesis is, foremost, a descriptive endeavor that seeks to explore and analyze media 
perceptions of the BRI within the EU, and to provide a better-informed understanding thereof.  
The main contribution of this analysis is in mapping out existing media perceptions of the BRI in 
the EU, shining light on future prospects of the BRI in the EU. In doing so, a road-map for future 
research is created upon which new hypotheses can be generated, and causality can be probed. 
As detailed above, the main variable of interest, media tonal scores, will be examined in four 
different ways.  
First, with respect to the main research question, tonal scores for each member state are 
averaged over the 2017-2019 time period. For reference, an EU-wide tonal score is calculated 
based on an average of all member state scores. This score weights the tonal scores of all 27 
member states equally, once again in an effort to mirror the equal voting weight held by member 
states in the Council of the EU. Member states, with their corresponding tonal score, are then 
plotted in descending order from most positive to most negative. This represents the data at its 
most aggregated level. Second, and the first step in disaggregation, regional tonal scores are 
calculated based on an average of all member state scores within each respective region. Third, 
tonal scores are disaggregated into yearly averages for 2017, 2018 and 2019 to investigate 
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temporal change. The subsequent yearly data will be superimposed on a map of the EU to aid in 
eyeball estimation – a cursory inspection of change (Salkind, 2007).  
Lastly, in an effort to deepen our understanding of the statistics presented herein, regional 
outliers are identified and probed further. Through introductory case studies, the member states 
that occupy outlier positions within their respective region will be examined more closely. As the 
measures of media perception used in this analysis are constructed from averages, it is important 
to identify and interpret outlier cases in the whole of the EU, and regionally. The goal of this 
closer examination of select member states is to highlight possible country-level explanations for 
variations in media perceptions upon which future, more causally-inclined, research can be 
based. In order to structure interpretations, three possible explanatory variables will be analyzed 
in each case. These variables all represent different kinds of relations between the case countries 
and China. First, trade relations will be analyzed through export and import statistics, along with 
a brief dive into historical trade relations. Second, investment relations will be analyzed through 
Chinese outward investment statistics in case countries. Third, and more broadly, governmental 
positions towards China and the BRI will be analyzed. In short, these case studies are structured 
in a way to systematically uncover potential themes and country-level factors that contribute to 
media perceptions of the BRI across the EU. Moreover, these case studies supplement the tonal 
statistics detailed in the first part of the analysis and provide qualitative rigor to an otherwise 
statistically descriptive thesis.  
5.4 Limitations and Ontological/Epistemological Reflection 
This thesis makes use of advances in computational social science, big data, data visualization 
and case studies to answer the research question(s) posited herein to better understand the BRI 
within the context of the EU. However, the research design outlined does not come without flaws 
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and limitations. As previously noted, there are three methodological and data-specific limitations 
in this analysis. First, the GDELT data is limited to online news coverage and does not yet offer 
insight into alternative sources of media such as social media. Second, and relatedly, the GDELT 
data is only available from 2017-2019 and may thus limit the explanatory power of the results. 
This stems from an active choice in design that valued depth of research (unlimited keyword 
queries) over breadth (limited queries, but more extensive longitudinal data). As the BRI is a 
relatively recent concept with multiple names, this choice is acceptable. However, in an ideal 
research design, both would be permitted. Last, and the most technical limitation, the tonal 
scores are based on the sentiment of the entire article – not specifically the sentence(s) in which a 
key phrase is embedded. Therefore, it is possible that an article could be deemed positive, while 
the BRI-specific reference was negative, or vice versa.  
 In concluding, it is important to also reflect on the implicit ontological and 
epistemological foundations of this research. Ontologically, this thesis is conducted under the 
direction of constructivism and thus sees the world as socially constructed. Subsequently, this 
“leads to an interpretivist epistemology” (Furlong & Marsh, 2010, p. 186). While traditional 
interpretivism eschews quantitative methodologies all together, modern interpretivism has made 
room for systematic studies of social constructions (Furlong & Marsh, 2010). This thesis falls 
under the umbrella of modern interpretivism for it quantitatively documents and analyzes 
perceptions of the BRI, as socially constructed through media. In this way, I believe the scientific 
rigor and quantitative methods applied in this thesis will lend credence to the interpretivist 
tradition.  
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS 
Following the aforementioned research design, this section will present and systematically 
analyze media perceptions of the BRI in the EU in order to answer the research question(s) of 
this thesis and to assess its hypotheses. The first part of this analysis will graphically present 
media perceptions at both the EU and regional level, followed by a presentation of media 
perception change over time. The second part of this analysis will investigate regional outliers 
through introductory case studies. This deeper interpretative dive will focus on trade, investment 
and governmental relations between the case states and China in an effort to highlight potential 
country-level factors that may contribute to media perceptions of the BRI in EU member states. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
At the most aggregated level, Figure 2 displays the average tonal scores of EU member states for 
the full range of data available in GDELT (2017-2019); full data is available in the Appendix. 
Member states are plotted in descending order from the most positive average tonal score seen in 
the Netherlands (2.96) to the most negative average tonal score seen in Ireland (-1.01). Tonal 
scores are coded green for positive and red for negative, with the average EU score (0.41) shown 
as a vertical dotted black line. In total 19 member states averaged positive media perceptions 
towards the BRI, whereas eight member states averaged negative media perceptions. As these 
statistics are drawn solely from EU member states, they are best understood in relative terms. 
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Figure 2 
3-year Average Tonal Score for EU Member States (2017-2019) 
 
 
Note. Figure created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/. 
 
When these statistics are broken down at the regional level, a clear regional divergence 
emerges as shown in Table 1. As hypothesized, the Northwestern region of the EU averaged the 
most negative tonal score (0.18) of all three regions, anchored by the negative averages seen in 
Ireland (-1.01) and Sweden (-0.96). The Northwest region was followed closely by the Central 
and Eastern region (0.28) and then the Southern region (1.02). While the Northwestern region 
did average the most negative media perceptions towards the BRI, the Central and Eastern region 
maintained an average media perception below the whole of the EU (0.41). In addition, it was 
the Southern region of the EU that averaged the most positive media perceptions of the BRI, 
buoyed by the high averages seen in Portugal (2.36) and Italy (1.26).  
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Table 1 
3-year Average Tonal Score by EU Region (2017-2019) 
Region 3-year Average Tonal Score 
Northwestern EU 0.18 
Central & Eastern EU 0.28 
Southern EU 1.02 
Overall EU 0.41 
 
Note. Table created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/. 
 
 
In short, the averaged data presented from 2017-2019 capture varied media perceptions 
of the BRI across member states in the EU and highlight divergences between regions of the EU. 
Moreover, it is shown that the Northwestern region of the EU held the most negative media 
perceptions, confirming my first hypothesis (H1). However, the most striking finding is the 
positive media perceptions held in the Southern EU. While the gap in media perceptions between 
Northwestern and Central and Eastern EU was relatively small (0.1), the Southern EU was in a 
league of its own with a (0.7) gap in perceptions compared to the next closest region. So, my first 
hypothesis holds but the distinct positivity in the South was an unexcepted finding as the existing 
literature did not point to a positive consensus in the region. Rather, the Central and Eastern 
region was the more likely candidate for positivity based on its unique 17 + 1 cooperative 
framework with China and its higher favorability towards the Chinese.  
 Turning to aspects of temporal change within the data, tonal scores of EU member states 
are disaggregated into yearly averages for 2017, 2018 and 2019 as shown in Table 2. In addition, 
the overall EU tonal average per year is calculated by averaging the scores of all member states. 
The results are telling. In total, 20 of the 27 member states experienced a negative drop in tonal 
scores from 2017 to 2019. Moreover, six member states experienced a positive increase in tonal 
scores and one member state did not change over time. Notably, all six states with increases in 
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tonal scores were from the Central and Eastern region of the EU. At the EU level, the average 
tonal score dropped year over year from 2017 (0.67), to 2018 (0.33) to 2019 (0.22). To aid in the 
inspection of change, Figure 3 visualizes the data on a map of the EU. As noted by the tonal 
score scales, the more darkly shaded map of 2019, compared to 2017, indicates a negative shift 
in tonal scores. Thus, as hypothesized, the averaged tonal score across the EU has seen a 


















   38 
Table 2 
Yearly Average Tonal Score by EU Member State (2017, 2018, 2019) 
EU Member Country  Tonal Score 2017 Tonal Score 2018 Tonal Score 2019 
Austria 0.72 0.55 0.73 
Belgium -1.05 0.05 -1.33 
Bulgaria 0.39 0.31 1.25 
Croatia 0.72 1.32 0.29 
Cyprus 0.98 -0.41 0.62 
Czech Republic -0.78 -0.80 -0.72 
Denmark 0.58 -0.44 0.13 
Estonia 0.46 0.87 0.54 
Finland 0.97 0.72 -0.03 
France 1.08 -0.41 -0.87 
Germany 0.27 -0.53 -0.52 
Greece 1.74 0.92 0.03 
Hungary -0.09 -0.06 0.27 
Ireland -0.43 -1.41 -1.18 
Italy 1.41 1.64 0.74 
Latvia -0.05 0.00 0.09 
Lithuania 1.34 1.35 -0.84 
Luxembourg 0.83 0.64 0.43 
Malta 1.85 0.10 1.06 
Netherlands 3.34 2.39 3.16 
Poland 0.39 0.02 0.00 
Portugal 2.41 2.44 2.22 
Romania -0.07 -0.06 -0.58 
Slovakia -1.09 0.21 -0.10 
Slovenia 1.87 1.81 0.99 
Spain 0.33 0.51 -0.26 
Sweden 0.04 -2.88 -0.05 
Overall EU average 0.67 0.33 0.22 
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Figure 3 
Changing Media Perceptions towards the BRI in the European Union from 2017 to 2019 
 
 
Note. The tonal score scales for each map are based on the range of scores for the corresponding year. Figure created 




Finally, when yearly tonal scores are broken down by region, a clear regional divergence 
over time emerges as shown in Table 3. The Southern region of the EU demonstrated the most 
negative trend, with consecutive drops in tonal score from 2017 (1.45), to 2018 (0.86) to 2019 
(0.73). This amounted to the most marked negative drop (0.72) in tonal score from 2017 to 2019. 
This downward trend was due in large part to Greece’s significant drop in tonal score (1.71) 
from 2017 to 2019. This is a striking find as Greece just recently (2019) joined China’s 17 + 1 
strategy and is home to the Port of Piraeus – one of China’s earliest, and most visible, 
investments in Europe. The Northwestern region of the EU demonstrated the second largest drop 
(0.58) in tonal score from 2017 to 2019, followed lastly by the Central and Eastern region (0.17). 
It is important to note that while the Southern region experienced the most substantial drop in 
tone, its yearly tonal score remained above the overall EU average every year as well as above 
the yearly averages seen in any other region.  
 
Table 3 
Yearly Average Tonal Score by EU Region (2017, 2018, 2019) 
Region Tonal Score 2017 Tonal Score 2018 Tonal Score 2019 
Northwestern EU 0.63 -0.13 0.05 
Central & Eastern EU 0.28 0.45 0.11 
Southern EU 1.45 0.86 0.73 
Overall EU average 0.67 0.33 0.22 
 
Note. Table created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/. 
 
 
In short, the year-by-year data presented here show an overall negative trend in media 
perceptions of the BRI in the EU as a whole. However, the Northwestern region of the EU did 
not register the most marked negative trend in perception, therefore my second hypothesis (H2) 
is only partially supported. This finding was unexpected, as it was hypothesized that the
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advanced economies of the Northwest would be most directly challenged by China’s expansion 
into high-value production and their strategic high-tech acquisitions in the region. However, in 
fact, it was the South that demonstrated the most marked negative turn in media perceptions of 
the BRI.  
6.2 Case Studies and Discussion 
Now, moving from general statistics to specific cases, the outlier member states from each region 
will be examined through introductory case studies. First, the Netherlands will be examined as it 
represents both the highest tonal average within the Northwestern region, and in the EU at large. 
Second, the Czech Republic will be examined in light of its outlier negative tonal score within 
the Central and Eastern region. Third, Portugal will be examined as it represents the highest tonal 
average within the Southern region, and second highest tonal average in the EU as a whole. In 
concluding, possible country-level explanations for variations in media perceptions of the BRI 
will be drawn from the case studies in an effort to spur further research.
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Figure 4 
3-year Average Tonal Score for Northwestern EU (2017-2019) 
 
 
Note. Figure created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/. 
 
 
In the Northwestern EU, the Netherlands represents an island of positivity as shown in 
Figure 4. Interestingly, both the highest average tonal score (Netherlands) and the lowest 
(Ireland) are captured within this region. However, it is the Netherlands that stands out. In its 
absence, the regional average drops from (0.18) to (-0.13) – giving the Northwestern region the 
only average negative tonal score of all regions during the 2017-2019 timespan. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate the outlier status of the Netherlands. In following, Dutch-Chinese trade 
and investment relations are surveyed, followed by an examination of governmental relations. 
The Netherlands and China have long enjoyed productive trade relations, with the Dutch 
recognizing the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s – much earlier than other European 
nations (Chang & Pieke, 2018). Traditionally, the Dutch have looked to China as a beacon of 
opportunity, ripe with economic potential. Likewise, the Chinese have viewed the Dutch as a 
strong partner within the EU and as an important advocate for free trade (Chang & Pieke, 2018). 













Despite the Netherlands recent strategic repositioning vis-à-vis China,29 the two countries remain 
key trading partners (Netherlands, 2019). For the better part of the last decade the Netherlands 
has been a top-three trading partner of China within the EU. In fact, according to Eurostat 
(2020), in 2019 the Netherlands was the top importer of goods from China – surpassing both 
Germany and France. Moreover, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2020), 
in 2018 the Netherlands was China’s eighth largest export destination worldwide.30 For the 
Netherlands, China represents its largest trading partner in Asia and has seen a roughly ten-fold 
increase in imports from the Netherlands from 2001 to 2017 (Netherlands, 2019). As such, the 
two countries are bound by mutual trade interests at present.  
Moving from trade to investment, during the 2000-2019 period the cumulative value of 
Chinese outward investment transactions into the Netherlands totaled 10.2 billion dollars (Kratz, 
Huotari, Hanemann & Arcesati, 2020, p. 11). This ranks the Netherlands fifth overall in the EU-
27 for Chinese investment since the beginning of the century. While investment into the 
Netherlands from China has increased during this time period, as of 2017, the Chinese share of 
foreign investments in the Netherlands remains below one percent (Netherlands, 2019). As for 
China’s new investment framework, the BRI, the Netherlands has yet to officially join. However, 
as global temperatures rise its increasingly strategic location along the Northern Sea Route make 
the Netherlands a potential key player in the project (Chang & Pieke, 2018). 
Lastly, it is important to recognize the Dutch government’s position towards China in 
light of their deep economic ties. Until very recently, the Dutch have maintained an ‘open and 
                                               
29 The Dutch government unveiled a new, harder-line, ‘China strategy’ in May of 2019. This comes in stark contrast 
to its 2014 ‘Open and Pragmatic Partnership’ for cooperation. For more details see Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. (2019). The Netherlands and China: A new balance (pp. 1-104). The Hague: The Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
30 For a more detailed visual of Chinese-Dutch trade statistics see https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn/. 
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pragmatic’ relationship with China (Netherlands, 2014).31 In fact, Xi Jinping’s first European 
state visit after assuming the presidency was to the Netherlands (Van der Putten, 2015). This 
relationship is driven by the Dutch’s general economic openness, and history of a globalized 
economy (Van der Putten, Ho, 2020). This tradition of economic liberalism even carried over 
into debates over the Netherland’s new China strategy published in 2019 – where economic and 
security interests clashed (NOS, 2019). As a result, the Dutch’s new strategic position towards 
China is “open where possible, protective where necessary” (Netherlands, 2019, p. 31). In short, 
a traditional Dutch governmental adherence to openness in trade and investment from China may 
have informed positive media perceptions in the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 5 
3-year Average Tonal Score for Central and Eastern EU (2017-2019) 
 
 
Note. Figure created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/. 
 
                                               
31 For more details see Netherlands, Ministry of General Affairs. (2014). Joint Statement between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the establishment of an Open and Pragmatic Partnership 
for Comprehensive Cooperation. The Hague: The Netherlands Ministry of General Affairs. 














In Central and Eastern EU, the Czech Republic stands out as an anchor of negativity as 
shown in Figure 5. Of the 11 EU member states in the Central and Eastern region, only three 
averaged negative tonal scores across the 2017-2019 period. The Czech Republic represents the 
extreme pole of this negativity, with an averaged tonal score more than twice as negative as the 
next closest country (Slovakia). Moreover, of the five most negative tonal scores out of all EU 
member states, the Czech Republic had the most stable negativity year-over-year. Therefore, it is 
important to probe this case further. In doing so, Czech-Chinese trade and investment relations 
are outlined, followed by an examination of governmental relations. 
The Czech Republic and China have historically had limited trade relations, as the post-
communist state mainly focused its economic attention westward following its independence 
(Fürst, 2020). The two countries have only recently developed closer trade relations under the 
presidency of Miloš Zeman. As a result, according to Eurostat (2020), in 2019 the Czech 
Republic was the eighth largest importer of goods from China in the EU – only second behind 
Poland in the Central and Eastern region. In terms of exports, according to Eurostat (2020), in 
2019 the Czech Republic was the thirteenth largest exporter of goods to China in the EU – once 
again second to Poland in the region. While trade relations remain modest within the context of 
the entire EU, the Czech Republic ranks as a top-two trading partner within Central and Eastern 
region. 
Departing from issues of trade, Czech-Chinese investment relations have formalized 
recently under the framework of the 17 + 1 strategy and the BRI. In March of 2016, Xi Jinping 
visited the Czech Republic, a historic first for a Chinese president, and signed a strategic 
partnership agreement with the explicit intent of strengthening business and investment ties. This 
was followed later that year by bilateral collaboration through the BRI at the 17 + 1 Summit in 
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Riga (Kizeková, 2018). Yet, despite pushes from President Zeman and pro-business lobbies, the 
investment footprint of China in the Czech Republic remains low. From 2000 to 2019, the 
cumulative value of Chinese outward investment transactions into the Czech Republic totaled 1 
billion (Kratz et al., 2020, p. 11). This ranks them eighteenth overall in the EU-27 for Chinese 
investment since the beginning of the century. As of 2017, the Chinese share of foreign 
investments in the Czech Republic amounted to half a percent (Fürst, 2020, p. 42). Moreover, 
Chinese investments have been mired in controversy thanks in large part to the corrupt dealings 
of CEFC China Energy. CEFC became the face of Chinese investment in the Czech Republic 
through prominent investments in breweries, media assets and Prague’s top football club (Allen-
Ebrahimian & Tamkin, 2018). Additionally, CEFC’s chairman, Ye Jianming, was named an 
advisor to President Zeman (Garlick, 2019). However, Ye’s 2018 detainment in China on 
charges of corruption derailed CEFC’s Czech investments and spurred widespread backlash 
(Allen-Ebrahimian & Tamkin, 2018). Therefore, while much was promised, little was delivered. 
 Lastly, it is important to recognize the Czech Republic’s historical defense of human 
rights. Born out of the peaceful Velvet Revolution, the Czech government has a history of 
criticizing China for its violations of human rights, dating back to its 1998 formal resolution on 
the matter. In addition, the Czech Republic’s repeated engagement with the Dalai Lama, Tibetan 
exiles, Taiwan and Chinese dissidents has drawn the ire of China (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010). As 
a result of this tense past, Czech society has fragmented over the issue of China. However, while 
there is no consensus among political elites on issues involving China, the Czech media has 
historically criticized China and supported Tibet (Chen & Hao, 2020, p. 161). Moreover, Czech 
media discourses in the 1990s and 2000s “tended to depict China as an assertive communist 
power” (Chen & Hao, 2020, p. 167). Therefore, despite President Zeman’s recent intense 
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courtship of China, legacies of human rights defense and anti-communist sentiments may have 
persisted in generating negative views of China’s BRI in Czech media.  
 
Figure 6 
3-year Average Tonal Score for Southern EU (2017-2019) 
 
 
Note. Figure created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/. 
 
 
In the Southern EU, Portugal sits atop a region in which all member states averaged 
positive tonal scores. Moreover, across EU member states, Portugal registered the second highest 
average tonal score, closely following the Netherlands. Therefore, the case of Portugal deserves a 
more careful analysis. In following, Portuguese-Chinese trade and investment relations are 
surveyed, followed by an examination of governmental relations. 
Portugal and China have a history of trade relations dating back to the 16th century, at 
which time the Portuguese began to occupy modern-day Macau. This was a leased settlement 
from 1557 to 1887, and served as a key trading-post for the Portuguese in Asia. Following 1887, 
Macau formally came under the control of the Portuguese and remained so until its handover to 









China in 1999 (Albert, 2019). At present, trade relations remain modest. According to Eurostat 
(2020), in 2019 Portugal was the sixteenth largest importer of goods from China in the EU – 
falling in the bottom-half of the Southern region. In terms of exports, according to Eurostat 
(2020), in 2019 Portugal was the nineteenth largest exporter of goods to China – once again 
falling in the bottom-half of its region.  
Yet, where Portuguese-Chinese trade remains underdeveloped, Chinese investments in 
Portugal are robust. In the aftermath of the European debt crisis, Portugal became a key recipient 
of Chinese investments. By 2015, Portugal had the highest Chinese cumulative investment ratio 
within the EU (Fernandes, 2020).  These investments are diverse across sectors, but heavily 
concentrated in energy and utilities. The first major investment came in 2011, when China’s 
Three Gorges Corporation acquired 21% of the Portuguese state-owned electric utilities 
company Energia de Portugal (Pareja-Alcaraz, 2017). This acquisition was followed in 2012 by 
another major state sell-off in which the State Grid Corporation of China purchased a 25% stake 
in REN – Portugal’s national power company (Pareja-Alcaraz, 2017). More recently, Chinese 
investments in Portugal have been subsumed under the framework of the BRI. In 2018, 
following a visit from Xi Jinping, Portugal entered into a formal agreement with China as a 
partner in the BRI (Albert, 2019). In sum, over the 2000-2019 time period the cumulative value 
of Chinese outward investment transactions into Portugal totaled six billion (Kratz et al., 2020, p. 
11). This ranks them seventh overall in the EU-27 for Chinese investment since the beginning of 
the century. In addition, Portugal recently became the first eurozone country to issues bonds in 
Chinese yuan and has set out on a 5G partnership with Huawei – the controversial Chinese 
technology company (Albert, 2019).  
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Lastly, it is important to recognize the general positive consensus around China in the 
Portuguese government. From 2011 to 2015, the right coalition led by Prime Minister Pedro 
Passos Coelho oversaw austerity measures implemented by the European Commission. Most 
importantly, they aided in China’s investment in Portuguese companies during a period of 
privatizations (Goncalves, Bugge, 2018). Since 2015, the left coalition led by Prime Minister 
António Costa has more overtly pursued relations with China. Costa has been a staunch 
opponent of EU protectionism, and a quick defender of Chinese investment. He has publicly 
stated that Portugal’s “experience with Chinese investment has been very positive,” and that 
China has “shown complete respect for our legal framework and the rules of the market” (Hall & 
Wise, 2019, para. 8). This positive depiction of China and the BRI is furthered by the lack of 
public debate on the topic. Academics have been hesitant to critically assess Chinese 
investments, and most public discourse is guided by the government’s openly supportive stance 
(Le Corre, 2018). Unlike in the case of the Czech Republic, support for China’s BRI is not 
readily challenged and its positive portrayal may be a mere reflection of the government’s 
position.  
While by no means conclusive, these case studies do offer preliminary evidence into 
country-level factors that may drive variation in media perceptions of the BRI across member 
states. Through these comparative cases, two main themes can be surmised. First, the depth of 
economic relations between case countries and China mostly fall in line with variations in media 
perceptions. In the Netherlands and Portugal, more extensive trade and investment relations were 
associated with more positive media perceptions of the BRI. The Netherlands represented the top 
destination for Chinese goods in the EU (Netherlands, 2019), while Portugal maintained one of 
the highest ratios of Chinese FDI with investments in key economic sectors (Fernandes, 2020). 
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Whereas, in the Czech Republic low rates of Chinese investment and modest trade relations were 
associated with more negative media perceptions of the BRI (Kratz, 2020). Moreover, the BRI 
promise of increased and sustained Chinese investment fell short of expectations and prompted 
backlash against the project in the Czech case (Allen-Ebrahimian & Tamkin, 2018).  
Second, the nature of governmental relations between case countries and China, along 
with their political legacies, offer anecdotal evidence into media perception variation. Foremost, 
the Czech Republic’s historical defense of human rights, diplomatic engagements with Taiwan 
and Tibet, and anti-communist sentiments are associated with more negative media perceptions 
of China’s BRI (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010). In the Netherlands, pragmatic governmental relations 
with China focused on economic engagement and the global defense of free trade are associated 
with more positive media perceptions of the BRI. Furthermore, Portugal’s recent reliance on, and 
praise of, Chinese investment coupled with its historic ties to Macau are also associated with 
more positive media perceptions.  
 While an assessment of significance is beyond the scope of this analysis, future research 
must operationalize and test the potential explanations drawn from these case studies. It is my 
hope that these country-level factors will offer further insight into divergences in media 








While much has been made of European perceptions of China, and its image, there remains a gap 
in understanding of its newest foreign policy tool: the BRI. Understood as a vehicle of China’s 
diplomacy in Europe, the BRI has come to represent far more than a simple means of economic 
cooperation. Rather, it is increasingly seen as a geopolitical project keen on wielding influence 
across the Eurasian expanse. Its ever-evolving nature deeply reliant on its conceptual acceptance, 
far less on the nuts and bolts it produces. At the end of this road lies Europe, home to the largest 
single market in the world and ripe with geopolitical potential for China. As both the final 
destination and main rationale of the BRI, the EU matters (Maçães, 2019). Moreover, the 
positive perceptions of its member states matter as they form the basis of collective policies 
towards China. Yet, there has been no attempt to systematically map and assess existing 
perceptions of the BRI across the EU. This thesis set out to fulfill this important task.  
 This thesis sought to answer questions of regional divergence in media perceptions of the 
BRI at the member state level, and temporal change in those perceptions. In order to tackle these 
questions, a constructivist research agenda was employed that privileged domestic actors, 
particularly public opinion, in the process of national policy generation. As the BRI is a new and 
evolving project, public opinion data was not yet available specifically targeting the BRI. This 
absence guided the research towards the media as a proxy measurement of public opinion. In 
doing so, agenda setting and framing theory were utilized to better understand the role of the 
media in the context of perceptions of the BRI. Moving from theory to practice, the GDELT 
database was used to operationalize the main concept of interest ‘media perception’. In total, 
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average media perceptions for all EU member states was collected for the years 2017, 2018 and 
2019. The data was telling.  
 As hypothesized, media perceptions of the BRI diverged along regional patterns. The 
Northwestern region of the EU averaged the most negative media perceptions over the 2017-
2019 period, while the Southern region averaged the most positive. However, the range of media 
perceptions in the Northwest suggest that other underlying factors may be at play beyond 
regionality. In addition, as hypothesized, a clear temporal pattern across the EU in media 
perceptions of the EU emerged. The averaged year-by-year data uncovered a negative trend in 
media perceptions, with the most negative turn shown from 2017 to 2018. However, contrary to 
expectations, the Southern region demonstrated the most pronounced negative trend in media 
perception. Departing from descriptive statistics, regional outliers were systematically examined 
through introductory case studies to aid in uncovering possible country-level factors contributing 
to variations in media perception. Through an examination of economic statistics, it is shown that 
higher rates of Chinese investment and more extensive trade relations are for the most part 
positively associated with media perceptions of the BRI. Most notably, China’s deep investment 
in Portugal since the European debt crisis may have translated to current positive media 
perceptions of the project. In addition, the nature of governmental relations between case 
countries and China may have lasting impacts on media perceptions of China’s modern-day BRI. 
In particular, the Czech Republic’s historic ties with disputed Chinese territories and legacy as a 
human rights advocate are associated with negative media perceptions of the BRI.  
 However, as previously mentioned, the descriptive nature of this thesis limited causal 
inference. Beyond this inherent limitation of my research design, three other limitations of this 
thesis deserve acknowledgement. First, this analysis only accounted for divergences in media 
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perceptions of the BRI between member states, not within. As some states are highly 
decentralized, perceptions of the BRI could, and most likely do, diverge within states. Moreover, 
divergences within states could also be found at the individual level – where people’s 
perceptions of foreign relations are preconditioned by any number of factors. Second, this 
analysis assumed a certain level of congruence in media freedom. While all EU member states 
are considered democracies during the 2017-2019 period, a distinction can be made between ‘full 
democracies’ and ‘flawed democracies’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). For the purposes of 
this thesis, member states were analyzed broadly as democracies, as opposed to ‘hybrid’ or 
‘authoritarian’ regimes. Relatedly, distinctions in media perceptions of the BRI were not made 
between different types of media sources. Third, and last, the arc of the data presented herein is 
short. While three years of data (2017-2019) is not trivial, it does offer somewhat limited insights 
into trends in media perceptions of the BRI. Therefore, it is incumbent upon future research to 
probe issues of causality, explore perception divergences within member states and to assess 
media freedom; while also advancing methods in computational sentiment analysis that allow for 
a longer timeline of data.  
 Going forward, 2020 will be an important year for EU-China relations – specifically in its 
handling of the BRI. In 2019, the EU set the stage for a more confrontational approach towards 
China. In successive moves, the EU labelled China a ‘systemic rival’ and finalized a common 
screening mechanism for Chinese investments (Brattberg & Le Corre, 2020). The issue of China 
was no longer to be taken lightly. Now, in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has furthered the EU’s 
discontent and laid bare the need to wean itself off its dependence on China (Small, 2020). 
Furthermore, subsidized BRI projects on the continent and abroad threaten to undermine member 
states’ attempts to diversify their supply chains away from China (Small, 2020). In light of these 
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developments, it is vitally important to continue collecting and assessing media perceptions of 
the BRI in the EU. These perceptions will play a vital role in the EU’s collective response to 
China, and will ultimately impact the fate of the BRI in Europe. A continued negative turn in the 






































APPENDIX 1: UNDERLYING DATA FOR FIGURE 2 
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APPENDIX 2: UNDERLYING DATA FOR FIGURE 4 
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Note. Table created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/ 
 
APPENDIX 3: UNDERLYING DATA FOR FIGURE 5 
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Note. Table created by author, data based on https://www.gdeltproject.org/ 
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APPENDIX 4: UNDERLYING DATA FOR FIGURE 6 
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